Nano-scale devices are continuously shrinking, operating at lower voltages and higher frequencies. This makes them more susceptible to environmental perturbations and distinguished by their high dynamic fault rates. Redundancy techniques are widely used to increase the reliability of combinational logic circuits. In this work, soft error reliability is improved by using such techniques, and based on probability of occurrence for combinations at the outputs of circuits. A generalized modular redundancy scheme to enhance the reliability of combinational circuits is proposed. Additionally, several aspects regarding the application of this scheme are explored. This comprises types of redundant modules, complexity of voters and single versus multiple outputs protection. Also, a methodology for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme is developed. Reliability analysis for various benchmarks from the LGSynth91 suite shows that the proposed methodology can achieve reliability figures higher than that of triple modular redundancy. In general, significant overhead savings are accomplished in addition to that superior reliability.
Introduction
In nanometric technologies, circuits are increasingly sensitive to various kinds of perturbations. The reduced noise margin of these nano-scale devices increases the effect of external fault sources. Moreover, operating at low voltages and high frequencies makes these devices more fragile and sensitive to environmental influences. The soft error rate (SER) produced by these effects may exceed the failure in time (FIT) specifications in various application domains. In such applications, soft-error mitigation schemes should be employed for both memories and logic.
All fault tolerance approaches rely on some sort of redundancy. Otherwise, there will be no way to tell that a device has changed its state into an incorrect one. Many researches have investigated increasing the reliability of circuits using various redundancy schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Their main concern is to increase reliability while minimizing the inevitable overhead of area, power, or time.
In [6] , a generalized reliability model that unifies the notations for various existing fault tolerant models is given. It is shown that existing fault tolerant systems such as those based on N modular redundancy (NMR) as well as static and dynamic systems are particular cases of the given generalized reliability model. In the work done by Mohanram et al. [1] , two soft error rate reduction heuristics were introduced. They are cluster sharing reduction and dominant value reduction. These two reduction procedures are then combined to form the partial error masking scheme. It starts with a triple modular redundancy (TMR) realization for error masking that is first reduced using cluster sharing. The soft error failure rate of the resulting implementation is then estimated along with the area overhead. Dominant value masking is then used to further reduce area overhead. Another similar approach to the dominant value reduction is also proposed by Krishnaswamy et al. in [2] . Their technique increases logic masking at high-impact nodes by exploiting redundancy already present in the circuit as identified by covering relationships among existing nodes.
In [7] , the authors proposed a method that selects the best subset among possible redundant architectures. It is built upon the progressive module redundancy technique and the block grading concept. Efficiency is achieved by taking into account grades of blocks with respect to reliability, by adding redundancy progressively and by considering mixed modular redundancy. The idea is to add redundancy first on the blocks that have higher weights, because they contribute to higher reliability improvements, and then on the blocks with lower weights. The authors in [8] suggest that simple replication of micro-architecture modules will no longer suffice, as all replicated modules will have faults. They introduce the concept of history index of correct computation (HICC), where they developed a technique to tolerate the expected flawed nano-chips at run time. The HICC is a measure of a hardware unit's reliability. The HICC module transmits the correct computation based on the history indices of redundant units that implement the identical function. The redundant unit with the highest history index is considered to be the most reliable one, and is selected to transmit its computation.
In [9] , two algorithms for the selective assignment of input don't cares (DCs) are proposed to enhance input error resilience. They showed that selective reliability-driven DC assignment can enhance robustness and avoid the high overheads associated with complete reliability-driven DC assignment. In [10] , the authors introduced the idea of synthesizing combinational circuits to increase their tolerance for soft errors. Their idea is based on extracting sub-circuits from the original multilevel circuit and re-synthesizing each extracted sub-circuit to increase fault masking. After that, the re-synthesized sub-circuits are merged back to the original circuit.
In this work, we are targeting the reliability issue in the logic based on probabilities of signals and output combinations. We will make use of this information to build up a reliable version from the original circuit, while maintaining the minimum possible area overhead based on a proposed generalized modular redundancy scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the generalized modular redundancy (GMR) concept. In Section 3, we discuss various aspects concerning the application of the GMR scheme. Based on that, the developed methodology of applying GMR to enhance the reliability of combinational circuits is then presented. In Section 4, the fault model and reliability evaluation methodology are presented. Section 5 provides some analyses and evaluations of different aspects about the proposed methodology. Reliability results of various benchmarks are also reported. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work.
Generalized modular redundancy
Given a combinational logic circuit with multiple inputs, outputs, and a set of output combinations. Each combination at the output of the circuit has a probability of occurrence. Based on these probabilities, reliability of the logic will be enhanced by protecting those combinations with high probability of occurrence. Reductions in area overhead will be achieved by not protecting combinations with low probability of occurrence.
Based on their probability of occurrence, combinations at the primary outputs of a combinational circuit can be classified into two types: dominant combinations with high probability of occurrence, and those combinations with low probability. When the probability of occurrence for a certain combination is greater than a certain threshold, it is considered as a dominant combination. Other combinations are the ones with low probability of occurrence. Therefore, dominant combinations will be considered for reliability enhancement due to their highly skewed susceptibility to soft errors.
To increase reliability of circuits, extra redundant modules will be introduced to the logic. New combinations now consist of original outputs and the outputs of redundant modules, as shown in Fig. 1 . Modules R1 and R2 are redundant modules. As faults appear in the logic, faulty combinations might be observed at the outputs. These faulty combinations have to be identified. Then, correct combinations will be recovered from these faulty ones through a correction logic.
To recover from single errors in protected combinations, their faulty combinations have to be individually identified. The Hamming distance between a protected combination A, and its faulty combination is 1. Similarly, the Hamming distance between a protected combination B and any of its faulty combinations is also 1. To insure that no two combinations are identical, the Hamming distance between combinations A and B must be kept at least 3. For the same reason, Hamming distances between protected and unprotected combinations must be at least 2. Finally, no logic sharing is allowed between different outputs, so that no single error can propagate to more than one output. These Hamming distance requirements have been investigated in previous work for enhancing sequential circuits reliability [5] . Original outputs plus outputs of redundant modules will be then fed to correction logic to produce the protected outputs, as shown in Fig. 2 . Redundant modules should be carefully selected in order to meet previously stated Hamming distance requirements. The introduction of redundant modules and correction logic does not introduce new combinations in the final output (after the correction logic), otherwise the function of the circuit would no more be the desired one. But of course, we get new intermediate combinations before the correction logic (as inputs to the correction logic).
Single output protection
Consider the case of a single output circuit or one module. combinations at the output are the simple combination 0 or combination 1. In some cases, the probability of having one combination is far larger than the probability of having the other. So, the dominant combination will be selected for protection, while the other will not. Assume that logic 0 is dominant. New redundant modules have to be introduced to the logic. By replicating the module one time, the Hamming distance requirements are satisfied. After adding the extra module, combination ''0'' will become ''00'' and combination ''1'' will become ''11''. The first requirement of having a Hamming distance of 3 between protected combinations is not applicable as there is only one combination to protect. The Hamming distance between the protected combination and the unprotected combination equals to 2. The third requirement is met while synthesizing the circuit by selecting the option of single output optimization to disable logic sharing between different outputs.
If an error hits and alters the output, while the circuit is at combination ''00'', the resulting faulty combination will be either ''01'' or ''10''. In order to obtain the correct output, both original and redundant outputs will be fed to a correction logic. In this case, dominance of combination 0, it turns out that this correction logic is an AND gate. Fig. 3(a) demonstrates these findings. The same observations can be found when the dominant combination is ''1''. However, the correction logic in this case is an OR gate, Fig. 3(b) . The use of these dominant combinations along with simple correction logic (And, OR) has been observed earlier in the literature, but without this derivation [1] .
For the case of protecting the ''0'' output combination, if ''11'' was the expected output and it changed to ''01'' or ''10'' due to a soft error, correction logic will produce a ''0'' and the output will be in error. However, as the probability of having ''11'' combination is low, this will have a tiny impact on the overall reliability of the circuit.
When there is no dominant combination, the two combinations need to be protected. By replicating the module twice, the Hamming distance requirements are satisfied. The Hamming distance between the protected combinations equals to three. There are no unprotected combinations left. To obtain the protected output, all original and redundant outputs will be fed to a correction logic. Fig. 4 shows the result of replicating the module and the logic needed to obtain the protected output.
When protecting all combinations, we had to replicate the original module twice. Moreover, the logic that produces the protected output is essentially the 2-out-of-3 majority voter. So, with the purpose of protecting all combinations at the primary output we ended up applying TMR, where we have three exact copies of the original circuit plus a majority voter. When only the dominant combination is protected, area overhead is reduced by a whole module, and the voter is reduced to a single gate.
Multiple output protection
The full adder will be used to illustrate the idea of protecting multiple outputs together by using the generalized modular redundancy (GMR) scheme. The full adder consists of two sub-modules: Sum and Carry. Table 1 shows a full adder's truth table. Probability of occurrence for combinations ''0'' and ''1'' at the outputs of these modules are all equal to 0.5. Thus, there is no dominant combination in either of the modules. However, by looking at the outputs as a block, we can observe four different output combinations, namely: ''00'', ''01'', ''10'', and ''11''. It is clearly evident that some combinations are happening more frequently than others, assuming that all input patterns are equally likely to occur. Probability distribution of combinations at the full adder's outputs is: P(00) = 1/8, P(01) = 3/8, P(10) = 3/8, and P(11) = 1/8. It should be emphasized that the assumption that all input patterns are equally likely is used only for simplification. The proposed technique is independent of this assumption.
Obviously, there is no one dominant combination. However, by protecting more than one combination we can apply GMR scheme. Assume that we want to protect the two combinations with highest probabilities of occurrence (''01'' and ''10''). Fig. 5 shows that by replicating each module (Sum and Carry) only one time, the Hamming distance requirements are satisfied.
Eqs. (1) and (2), show that the Hamming distance required conditions are satisfied, where H is the Hamming distance between two combinations. As a result, faulty combinations which will result from a protected combination, when a single transient error hits the logic, are guaranteed to be disjoint from each other and from other unprotected combinations. The final outputs of the protected version of the full adder can be obtained using Karnaughmap as shown in Fig. 6 . It is evident that the area of this logic is comparable to the area of the majority voter.
Hð0011;
Hð0000; 0011Þ ¼ 2; Hð0000; 1100Þ ¼ 2;
Hð1111; 0011Þ ¼ 2; Hð1111; 1100Þ ¼ 2: ð2Þ Fig. 7 shows that in order to protect all combinations we need to replicate each module twice. The final protected outputs are also shown in the figure. In this case, protecting all combinations, we had to triplicate each module; the correction logic is identical to the majority voters used in TMR. Accordingly, we can think of TMR as a special case of GMR, where we protect all combinations at the output. Area overhead is reduced by two modules as opposed to TMR when we protect the dominant combinations only.
Enhancing combinational circuits reliability based on generalized modular redundancy
In this section, we will investigate module replication against introducing customized redundant modules, complexity of the correction logic, and the protection of single output versus multiple outputs. Based on that, the developed methodology of applying GMR to enhance the reliability of combinational circuits will be presented.
Module replication against customized redundant modules
In module replication, a redundant module is essentially a replica of one of the original modules in the circuit. However, newly introduced redundant modules are specially customized modules. This means that redundant modules can be customized and may not be a replica of the original module. In order to protect combinations at the outputs of combinational circuits, some requirements regarding the Hamming distance between states have to be met. Having this issue in mind, customized redundant modules, in some cases, are considered more flexible than replicated modules.
Consider combinations at the output of a circuit with two outputs. In order to protect the combinations ''00'', ''01'', and ''10'' by module replication, each module has to be replicated twice to satisfy the Hamming distance requirements. However, these requirements can be met by adding just three customized modules, resulting in a saving of one module. Fig. 8 demonstrates this, where M1 and M2 are original modules; R1 ? R4 are replicated modules and C1 ? C3 are customized redundant modules. Area overhead resulting from adding customized modules is most likely to be less than the overhead introduced by module replication due to existence of don't care conditions. Nevertheless, adding customized redundant modules requires full description or truth table in order to synthesize these modules properly. Therefore, in this work, customized redundant modules will be used when the truth table has a reasonable size (i.e. number of inputs 615). Otherwise, module replication will be used. However, partial truth tables can be used to synthesize customized redundant modules for circuits with large number of inputs, even though this will not guarantee masking of all faults.
Correction logic complexity
The idea behind GMR is to protect susceptible combinations against soft errors while saving some area overhead. Two sources of overhead exist in this method: redundant modules and correction logic. Having fewer redundant modules is the key to saving area overhead. However, if the correction logic or voters are complex enough, they will cause to override savings in area overhead. For this reason, correction logic must be minimal in terms of area. We have seen that only one gate (AND or OR) is needed to protect one combination at a single output circuit. A reasonable logic size is needed to protect combinations for circuits with two outputs. Majority voter is used when all combinations at the output are protected. However, our analysis show that protecting more than two outputs together demands larger logic to obtain the protected outputs. This may reduce the savings in area achieved by protecting a portion of the combinations at the output. For this reason, the use of GMR in this work is limited to protecting a single or a pair of outputs. In pair protection, the size of the correction logic when protecting two combinations is similar to that of the majority voter; it is smaller when only one combination is protected. However, the size becomes larger when three combinations are protected. This is acceptable, especially when the size of the modules is large enough. The size of the correction logic can be reduced further by using multilevel minimization techniques. Table 2 reports the size of the correction logic, for all possible scenarios, in number of literals in the sum of product (sop) form after using fast extraction ''fx'' and common cube extraction ''gcx'' for multilevel minimization which are implemented in the sequential interactive synthesis (SIS) package [11] .
In regard to output pair protection, the number of redundant modules is proportional to the number of protected combinations at the outputs. For example, to protect one combination at a two outputs circuit or sub-circuit, one customized redundant module has to be added to the logic. In order to protect two combinations, two customized redundant modules have to be introduced to meet Hamming distance requirements. Protecting three combinations will involve the addition of three customized redundant modules. It is clearly visible that in all these cases area overhead savings will be achieved. Protecting one combination saves three modules and protecting two combinations saves two modules in comparison to TMR. Even when protecting three combinations out of four, we are still able to save a whole module.
Reliability of the generalized modular redundancy scheme
In the first place, correction logic is designed to mask single errors. The majority voter in TMR, for a given output, is independent from any other output and depends only on the module producing this output in addition to its redundant modules. The same observation can be seen for GMR single output protection. However, in GMR output pair protection, the correction logic of both outputs depends on all original and redundant modules of both outputs.
For a pair of outputs in TMR, having P e as the probability that a module will be in error, the reliability is:
where a single error might happen within any of the six modules (2 original + 4 redundant modules), or two errors each occurring in one of the modules belonging to each output (1 original + 2 redundant modules), as they are independent. For a pair of outputs in GMR single output protection, having P S as the probability of combinations protection, the reliability is:
where a single error might happen within any of the four modules (2 original + 2 redundant modules) or two errors each occurring in one of the modules belonging to each output (1 original + 1 redundant module), as they are independent. For GMR output pair protection, the reliability when protecting one combination is:
where a single error might happen in one of the modules (2 original + 1 redundant). The reliability when protecting two combinations is:
as there are 4 modules (2 original + 2 redundant). Finally, the reliability when protecting three combinations is:
as there are 5 modules (2 original + 3 redundant).
In the above, we assume that voters/correction logic are perfect. Otherwise, we have to multiply all terms by (1 À P v ), where P v is the probability that the voter will fail. It should be emphasized that the probability of having an error in the module of an output, P e , differs between TMR and GMR. It should be less in GMR due to the use of customized redundant modules where the area is probably less; thanks to existing don't cares.
Having don't care conditions in customized redundant modules can add more fault tolerance in the circuit. When there is a don't care in an unprotected combination, we do not have to care about the value of the redundant module, as the Hamming distance requirements are already met. So, even if a transient error appeared at this extra module, we can still have a correct result at the output of the correction logic. Thus, if the don't care is present in a combination that is not protected this makes us tolerate errors in the customized module. However, if the don't care is in one of the protected combinations, then this will allow us to tolerate double errors by design. One error on the customized module that has the don't care and one error on any other module.
Single output versus output pair protection
The use of GMR in this work has been restricted to deal with a single or pair of outputs. Hence, an investigation has to be made in order to verify the effectiveness of each option. To achieve this, a test circuit with two outputs has been devised. Two protection procedures are performed. In the first one, single output protection is applied to each output, while in the other the two outputs are protected as a pair. In single output protection we need to add two redundant modules. For pair protection, we protect for two combinations as they require the same area overhead, in terms of redundant modules, when applying single output protection. The percentage of protected combinations at the outputs for both cases is set to be nearly the same. Later, correction logic is added to obtain the protected outputs. By analyzing the reliability of each method against soft errors, it is evident that single output protection is more advantageous, as shown in Fig. 9 . The size of correction logic, which is significantly larger in pair protection, together with probability of masking play an important role in this regards. As this logic has no protection against soft errors, reliability will be degraded as this logic gets bigger. Also, the reliability of single output protection is better than pair protection when protecting only one combination. This is shown in Fig. 10 . These findings are consistent for larger circuits. Thus, we will favor single output protection whenever it is possible.
Methodology of applying GMR
From the discussion above, we were able to reach some important conclusions about critical issues for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme to increase combinational circuits' fault tolerance. These conclusions comprise the following:
Customized redundant modules will be used when the truth table has a reasonable size (i.e., number of inputs 615) for both single and pair protection. Otherwise, module replication will be used for circuits with more than 15 inputs. Due to the complexity of the correction logic needed to obtain protected outputs, applying GMR protection will be limited to sub-circuits with one or two outputs. We will favor single output protection whenever it is possible. If not, pair protection will be used. Otherwise, triple modular redundancy will be applied.
Based on these conclusions, the methodology depicted in Fig. 11 will be used to apply GMR for enhancing combinational circuits reliability.
In the initialization step, a protection threshold for identifying dominant combinations at the outputs, thr, has to be specified. For a single output, a combination will be considered dominant if the probability of occurrence for this combination is greater than the threshold. However, for pair protection, meeting this threshold might require protecting more than one combination. Combinations with the highest probabilities of occurrence will be protected such that the sum of their probabilities must exceed protection threshold. A truth table of the circuit has to be provided also. This table will be used to calculate probability of occurrence for combinations at the outputs. For circuits with large number of inputs, the table will be unacceptably large. Thus, partial truth tables can be used to estimate probabilities of combinations at the outputs by simulation. Probability mass function (PMF) for the inputs can also be provided.
During evaluation, the probability of occurrence for the dominant combination P(D i ) at output i is calculated. Then, output i is paired with other available outputs j and the probability of occurrence for the dominant combination(s) P(D ij ) is calculated. As we may protect more than one combination, we keep track of the number of protected combinations N P ij when pairing output i with output j. After that, we choose the best candidate j for pairing with i such that P(D ij ) is greater than thr with minimum value for N P ij .
Next, a decision on the protection scheme has to be made. This includes single protection, pair protection and TMR. The cost of applying single-output protection for two outputs equals the cost of applying output pair protection when the number of protected combinations N P ij is two. For this reason, the scheme which provides maximum protection will be used, line 15 in the methodology. If both single protection and output pair protection are not applicable, then TMR will be used to protect the output.
Illustrative examples
A digital comparator serves as an excellent example for protecting multiple outputs together. A 4-bit digital comparator has two inputs A and B each of which is 4-bit long. It has two outputs. The output equals to ''00'' if and only if the two inputs are equal. It equals to ''10'' if A is greater than B, and to ''01'' if B is greater than A. Thus, the probability of having a ''00'' at the output is: Prob(00) = 2 4 /2 8 = 0.0625, while the probability of having a ''10'' or ''01'' equals to: Prob(10) = Prob(01) = (1 À Prob(00))/ 2 = 0.46875. The protection will be applied to combinations which are vulnerable to soft errors the most. This includes both combinations ''10'' and ''01''. By protecting these combinations, more than 93% of soft errors will be masked. In order to protect these two combinations, two redundant modules are required. Thus, we will end up using four modules instead of six in TMR. Due to the fact that only three out of four combinations appear at the output of the comparator, we can achieve 100% protection at the output while saving one module in comparison to TMR. This is because we need only three redundant modules to protect the three combinations at the output. Another illustrative example is the leading zero detector (LZD) used in floating point arithmetic. The LZD is used to find the proper shift amount to shift the result to the left until the MSB is 1. For example, a 24-bit leading zero detector circuit will have 24 inputs and 5 outputs. In this case, the combination ''00000'' has the highest probability of occurrence followed by ''00001'' then ''00010'' and so on.
Let the outputs of this circuit be: out0, out1, out2, out3 and out4 from the MSB to the LSB. To enhance the reliability of this circuit by using the generalized modular redundancy scheme, we will use the methodology discussed above. At first, we will set protection threshold, thr, to 0.9 and provide the truth table of the circuit. The algorithm will start with the evaluation step. The probability of having a ''1'' at out0 equals to P out0 (1) = 256/2 24 , and the probability of having a ''0'' at this output equals to P out0 (0) = 1 À P out0 (1) = 0.99998. We can see that P out0 (0) > thr, hence ''0'' is the dominant combination at out0 and P(D out0 ) = P out0 (0). After that, output out0 is paired with other available outputs (out1, out2, out3, and out4) and the probability of occurrence for the dominant combinations P(D ij ) is calculated. The results are as follows: P(D out0_out1 ) = 0.99609, P(D out0_out2 ) = 0.94116, P(D out0_out3 ) = 0.79998, and P(D out0_out4 ) = 0.66665. We can see that output out1 is the best candidate for pairing with out0 such that P(D ij ) is greater than thr with minimum value for N P ij , where P(D ij ) = P(D out0_out1 ) with N P out0 out1 ¼ 1.
At the decision step we have the following: PðD out0 Þ > thr; N P out0 out1 < 2 and P(D out0 ) > P(D out0_out1 ). As a result, out0 will be protected as a single output. The same process will be repeated for out1 and out2. They also will be protected as single outputs.
At this point, we are left out with out3 and out4. The evaluation step for out3 results in the following: P out3 (1) = 0.2, P out3 (0) = 1 À P out3 (1) = 0.8, and P out3 (0) < thr. There is no dominant combination at out3 as we have set the thr to 0.9. When pairing out3 with the only output left out4, the resulting dominant combination P(D out3_out4 ) equals to 0.933 with the number of protected combinations, N P out3 out4 , equals to 3. At the decision step we have: P(D out3 ) < thr, P(D out3_out4 ) > thr, and N P out3 out4 ¼ 3. As a result, out3 will be protected as a pair along with out4. By using GMR scheme, we are able to reduce area overhead by 4 modules; out0, out1 and out2 require one extra module for each as they are protected as single outputs; out3 and out4 are protected as pair and they require 3 extra modules as the number of protected combinations is 3. So, we ended up with 11 modules. However, protecting this circuit by TMR will require 5 Â 3 = 15 modules.
Experimental setup and framework
In this work, LGSynth91 1 benchmarks circuits, shown in Table 3 , are used. These contain a set of circuits with various sizes, in terms of size of the logic, and number of inputs and outputs.
Fault model and injection mechanism
In this work, we assume a stuck-open and stuck-short fault models at the transistor level. Faults can be injected at any transistor; stuck-open means that the transistor is stuck at the OFF state, Table 3 Benchmarks circuits.
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while stuck-short means that it is stuck at the ON state. The transistor level is used as soft errors usually alter the state of individual transistors. In each simulation iteration, a single or multiple faults are injected randomly, stuck-open or stuck-short is randomly applied to these faulty transistors.
Measurement of circuits reliability
For evaluating circuit failure probability and reliability, we adopt the simulation-based reliability model used in [12] . We compare circuit reliability based on the GMR scheme with TMR.
To compute the circuit failure probability, F m , resulting from injecting m defective transistors, we use the following procedure:
1. Set the number of iterations to be performed, I, to 10,000 and the number of failed simulations, K, to 0. 2. Simulate the fault-free circuit by applying a random test vector T. 3. Randomly inject m transistor defects. 4. Simulate the faulty circuit by applying the test vector T. 5. If the outputs of the fault-free and faulty circuits are different, increment K by 1. 6. Decrement I by 1 and if I is not 0 goto step 2. 7. Failure Rate F m = K/10,000.
Assuming that every transistor has the same defect probability, P, and that defects are randomly and independently distributed, the probability of having a number of m defective transistors in a circuit with N transistors follows the binomial distribution [12] as shown in Eq. (3).
Assuming the number of transistor defects, m, as a random variable and using the circuit failure probability F m as a failure distribution in m, the probability of circuit failure, F, and circuit reliability, R, are computed as in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
Reliability estimation of combinational circuits can be achieved by measuring their failure rates. Failure rate is the percentage of which a circuit will produce faulty output when a fault is injected in the logic. This way, reliability of a circuit is reciprocally proportional to its failure rate.
Experimental results
In order to investigate the applicability of the proposed methodology, it will be applied on the set of benchmarks presented in Section 4. We examine different values of protection threshold thr. Then, for each value, we evaluate the number of protected outputs in the following categories: GMR single output protection (S), output pair protection (P) and triple modular redundancy (T). For example, benchmark ''apex1'' has 11 outputs protected using GMR single output protection, 26 outputs protected using GMR output pair protection, and 6 outputs protected using TMR. Table  4 summarizes this evaluation.
Protection threshold, thr, can take values in the range ]0, 1[. As the value of thr drops below one, the number of modules protected by TMR will also decrease. These modules will be protected by GMR as singles or pairs. This is clearly visible in ''apex4'' benchmark where the number of modules protected by TMR has dropped from 10 to 1.
In most of the cases, the number of modules which are protected by TMR is considerably low. In fact, a good number of cases like: ''misex2'', ''misex3'', ''table3'', ''table5'', ''duke2'' and ''ex5p'' have almost no modules protected as TMR. This enables us to exploit the advantage of GMR where decent reliability figures are achieved while saving area overhead. For few benchmarks like ''clip'' and ''5xp1'' TMR is used despite the reduction of thr down to 0.75. For such cases no or limited area savings can be achieved.
From this analysis, we can see that the proposed methodology of applying GMR to increase fault tolerance of combinational circuits is very encouraging. Next, reliability that corresponds to different protection thresholds will be inspected for ''apex4'' benchmark.
Module saving analysis
The value of thr has to stay at high values to insure that the reliability of the protected circuits stays at acceptable rate. Fig. 12 depicts changing in overall reliability of ''apex4'' benchmark in Table 4 Analysis of output protection as single output (S), pair of outputs (P), TMR (T) at different protection thresholds. apex1  43  11  26  6  11  28  4  13  28  2  31  12  0  apex2  3  2  0  1  2  0  1  2  0  1  3  0  0  apex3  50  30  20  0  34  16  0  34  16  0  38  12  0  apex4  19  1  8  10  1  16  2  2  16  1  2  16  1  b12  9  0  8  1  0  8  1  0  8  1  3  6  0  clip  5  0  0  5  0  0  5  0  0  5  0  4  1  cordic  2  0  2  0  2  0  0  2  0  0  2  0  0  duke2  29  12  16  1  21  8  0  23  6  0  25  4  0  ex5p  63  26  36  1  36  26  1  51  12  0  63  0  0  misex2  18  10  8  0  13  4  1  13  4  1  15  2  1  misex3  14  0  14  0  13  0  1  13  0  1  13  0  1  sao2  4  2  2  0  2  2  0  2  2  0  2  2  0  seq  35  11  22  2  13  20  2  13  20  2  13  20  2  table3  14  1  12  1  10  4  0  14  0  0  14  0  0  table5  15  2  12  1  11  4  0  13  2  0  15  0  0  v g 2  8  4  0  4  4  0  4  4  0  4  4  2  2  z5xp1  10  0  2  8  0  2  8  0  2  8  1  2  7 response to different protection thresholds. Area overhead for TMR and GMR with thr equals to 0.95, 0.9 and 0.8 are respectively as follows: 303.70%, 298.41%, 259.67%, and 253.18%. This overhead includes the overhead of voters and correction logic. It is evident that the circuit with the highest protection threshold (0.95) has the best reliability. At thr equals to 0.9, decent reliability figures are achieved in addition to remarkable overhead savings. By decreasing the value of thr we can notice the corresponding reduction in reliability. It is evident that at thresholds higher than 0.8, GMR is able to achieve higher reliability figures than that of TMR along with decent savings in area overhead. At protection threshold equals to 0.95, 8 outputs are protected as 4 pairs and 1 output is protected as a single output. In each pair of outputs, we protect 3 out of 4 combinations which requires 3 redundant modules. The total savings in area overhead are 5 modules (4 in pair protection + 1 in single protection). Moreover, the existence of don't cares in the customized redundant modules (which is used in pair protection) increases fault tolerance of protected circuits. For example, in one of the customized modules within this circuit, more than 68% of the minterms are don't cares. These don't cares can significantly boost the reliability of the protected circuit. In addition to its higher area overhead, TMR protection lacks the advantage of the don't cares within the redundant modules. For these reasons, TMR falls short behind GMR even at thr equals to 0.8, where 20% of combinations at the outputs are not protected. At protection threshold equals to 0.9, we are able to save 4 more modules. When thr equals to 0.8, a total of 13 modules are saved against TMR protection. However, decreasing protection threshold results in the use of pair protection to protect four pair of outputs, where three combinations are protected, rather than TMR (as shown in Table 5 ). Away form savings in area overhead, this will have a negative effect as the correction logic when protecting three combinations is larger than the majority voters, and probability of masking for this logic is less. Therefore, due to the sacrifice made when protection threshold is reduced along with previously stated reasons, the reliability at 0.95 is better than that at 0.9 and lower.
Fault tolerance evaluation
In this section, we report reliability results of applying GMR protection, with thr equals to 0.9, to the set of benchmarks used in this work. These results are compared with the reliability of applying TMR protection. In Table 6 , we report the reliability results obtained based on the simulation procedure outlined earlier for the generalized modular redundancy scheme for several transistor defect probabilities based on stuck-open and stuck-short defects. In Table 7 , we report the reliability results for the triple modular redundancy scheme. Area overhead is also reported in the tables. It includes the overhead of voters and correction logic.
The effectiveness of the generalized modular redundancy scheme is clearly demonstrated by the results as it achieves higher circuit reliability when compared to that of triple modular redundancy, see also Fig. 13 . In addition, GMR scheme requires less area overhead as indicated in the tables.
For benchmarks with minimal savings in area overhead and where the size of modules is considerably small, the addition of voters to obtain protected outputs may cancel the savings. Sometimes, the total overhead of using GMR with such benchmarks may exceed the overhead of using TMR especially when pair protection is used which requires larger voters. ''b12'' benchmark is an example of such circuits. From Table 6 and Table 7 we can see that the area overhead when using GMR is greater than the overhead when TMR is used. Despite the increase of area overhead for this circuit, reliability of GMR is still better than that of TMR. This can be attributed to the existence of don't cares in the customized redundant modules. The only weak spot of a protected circuit is the voter which is added to obtain the protected outputs. As the size of this vulnerable part increases, reliability will degrade due to errors in this part of the circuit which is not protected. So, it is favorable to have voters which are as small as possible; like the voter in single output protection which is only one gate.
Effect of correction logic protection
In order to increase the fault tolerance of the error-prone correction logic, different techniques have been proposed. A cascade NMR or TMR scheme is offered using redundant voters to reduce the probability of circuit failure in the voter [13, 14] . The TMR process can be repeated by combining three of the TMR units with another majority voter to form a second-order TMR unit with even higher reliability. Another technique that adds redundancy at the transistor level and provides built-in immunity to stuck-open, stuck-short and bridges defects has also been proposed by El-Maleh et al. [4] . This technique is based on replacing each transistor by N 2 -transistor structure (N P 2) that guarantees defect tolerance of all N À 1 defects. It provides significantly less circuit failure probability and higher reliability than other techniques based on gate level (quadded logic) and unit level (TMR).
To investigate the effect of protecting voters on the overall reliability of the circuit, the technique in [4] will be used. Table 8 and Fig. 14 show the advantage of protecting voters in both cases where GMR and TMR were used for a 4-bit general comparator. We can clearly notice the benefit of protecting these voters and how they affect the overall reliability of the circuit. The overall area overhead of applying GMR and protecting voters for a digital comparator equals to the area overhead of applying TMR to that circuit. However, there is a huge improvement in reliability between these two cases. So, by utilizing the savings in area overhead achieved by GMR in protecting the voters, we can make the most of the generalized modular redundancy in terms of both reliability and area overhead. 
Conclusion
In this work, a generalized modular redundancy scheme to enhance the reliability of combinational logic circuits against soft errors has been proposed. It is based on probability of occurrence for combinations at the outputs of these circuits. An investigation on different aspects regarding the application of the generalized modular redundancy scheme has been done. This includes types of redundant modules, complexity of voters and single versus multiple outputs protection.
Furthermore, a methodology for applying the generalized modular redundancy scheme to increase the reliability of combinational logic circuits has been developed. Reliability analysis for various benchmark circuits shows that the proposed methodology can achieve reliability figures higher than that of triple modular redundancy. Generally, remarkable overhead savings are also accomplished in addition to that superior reliability.
